In September 1911, Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire and started its colonial conquest of Libya. There were two main reasons for Italy's intervention in Africa. First, Italy wanted to assert itself as a major actor in international politics. But, secondly, 50 years after its unification Italy was still a fragile state, weakened by the stark differences between the industrialised North and the mainly rural South. The political tradition dating back to Francesco Crispi viewed colonialism as a possible solution to Italy's economic and social woes.
As explained by Biagini, Italy's foreign policy extended in two main directions, the Balkans to the east and Northern Africa to the south. This was due to obvious geographical reasons, but also to the international political context of the time. In both the Balkans and North Africa Italy faced a decaying Ottoman Empire which, despite the attempts of the Young Turks movement, could not overcome its internal crisis and stop the gradual loss of its territories. While the Libyan war boosted Italy's potential in international politics, it also dealt a major blow to the Ottoman Empire, which finally disappeared after World War One.
The military conquest of Libya by the Italian army is described by Andrea Carteny in the first chapter. Italian troops faced an unexpected resistance in Libya, mainly led by the Arab population, while the Ottoman garrison basically operated as a coordinating network for local fighters. But the Italian army had a full-scale strategy that combined military operations with civilian assistance, aimed at winning local inhabitants' hearts and minds. Furthermore, the Italian officials managed to persuade the tribal leaders to give up their resistance and switch loyalties with the promise of giving them a political role in the future colonial administration of the country.
While colonialism was a matter of international prestige for the Italian ruling elite, in the Italian press the conquest of Libya was presented as a means to solve Italy's internal problems and improve social and economical conditions in southern Italy. As described by Roberto Reali in the second chapter, those who favoured the intervention claimed that the conquest of Libya would grant the southern Italian regions a major role and offer its inhabitants better living conditions.
In this framework, nationalist ideologues proposed the theory of 'proletarian colonialism', later espoused by the poet Giovanni Pascoli. This theory distinguished between proletarian nations such as Italy, and plutocratic nations such as France and Great Britain. Thus it justified Italian colonialism as a way of spreading Italy's proletarian civilisation while opposing rival French and British colonialism.
In the last chapter, Gabriele Natalizia analyses modern Italy's relations with Libya. Bilateral relations have often been troubled by Italy's colonial past, but the signature of the 2008 Friendship Treaty allowed the two countries to settle historical matters and to lay the groundwork for a stategic partnership. Now, with the emergence of a new government in Libya, Italy's presence in the African country seems disputed by the ambitions of rival European nations. Still, the author believes that Italy has considerable leverage at its disposal and, if Rome were to develop a coherent approach towards Libya, could succeed in maintaining its special relationship with Tripoli. (Giordano Merlicco)
